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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The bringing of derivative claims by the shareholders of
an English or Welsh company used to be restricted by
reason of the application of the common law rule in Foss v
Harbottle [1843] 2 Hare 461 (the position was the same in
Scotland). According to this rule, which was subject to
exceptions, an individual shareholder could not bring an
action on the company’s behalf against a director who was
in breach of his duties to the company. It was only possible
to bring such a claim if the wrongdoing was not ratifiable
or treated as such. Where an unratifiable wrong could be
identified, a derivative action by an individual shareholder
might not take place where the majority of the
shareholders in general meeting decided not to sue the
wrongdoing director(s), provided that the defaulting
director(s) did not control the company (Taylor v National
Union of Mineworkers (1985) BCLC 237).
The position was similar where an independent organ of
the company expressed itself opposed to litigation against
the wrongdoing director(s) (see Smith v Croft (No 2) 1988
Ch 114). The former position in relation to derivative
actions before the introduction of the new procedure in
Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006, which came into force
on October 1, 2007, is very well explained by H C Hirt in
his excellent article, “Ratification of breaches of directors
duties: the implications of the reforms proposed regarding
the availability of derivative actions” (24 Company Lawyer
(2004) 197.) The rules governing ratification appear to be
somewhat complex and uncertain in their effects: see
E Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance, OUP, 1999,
p143 in this sense.
The Law Commission made important proposals for the
amendment of the law relating to the derivative action in
its final report Shareholder Remedies (no 246, 1997) which
recommended that there should be a “new derivative
procedure with more modern, flexible and accessible
criteria for determining whether a shareholder can pursue
an action” and that the leave of the court should be
required to continue a derivative action. The Company
Law Reform Steering Group made a similar
recommendation regarding a simplified procedure for such
actions. This recommendation was adopted in sections
260-264 of Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006. This Act
also provided that such derivative claims could be brought
in relation to a cause of action vested in the company and
seeking relief on its behalf only with the permission of the
court. The 2006 Act further provides that derivative claims
may be brought by way of a petition under section 994,
which is concerned with unfairly prejudicial conduct of the
company’s affairs. The effect of section 996(2)(c) is to
enable the court to order a derivative claim if a petition
under section 994 is brought on the grounds that the
company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a
manner prejudicial to the interests of the members
generally, or some part thereof, is successful. It seems
unlikely that much use will be made of this procedure
except where it appears unclear to the plaintiff presenting
the petition that a derivative claim might be available.
The present article will specifically concern itself with
sections 260-269 of Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006.
It should be noted however that section 370 of the Act
provides for a statutory claim to enforce directors’
liabilities in the event of the contravention of certain
provisions governing political donations and expenditure.
The provisions of the Act relating to derivative actions in
Scotland included in sections 265-269 of the Companies
Act 2006 are generally identical, or almost the same as
those applicable to England and Wales or Northern Ireland
contained in sections 260-264 thereof. However they do
differ from the latter provisions in certain procedural
aspects.
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AMBIT OF THE DERIVATIVE CLAIM UNDER
PART 11 OF THE ACT (GENERAL STATUTORY
CLAIM)
A shareholder wishing to bring such a derivative claim
has to seek the consent of the court to continue it (see
Companies Act 2006, s 261, or s 266 for the position in
Scotland; this power of the court should prevent any great
increase in the number of derivative claims which was
feared in the House of Lords). The court is no longer
bound by the rule in Foss v Harbottle in reaching its decision,
but it has to consider certain matters which were relevant
to this rule in deciding whether it is in the interests of the
company for the action to be brought (see Gower and
Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, 8th ed, P L Davies,
Sweet and Maxwell, 2008, p 615, in this sense). The
company must be made a defendant to the claim in
accordance with rule 19.9(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules.
The derivative claims which may be brought under Part
11 of the Companies Act 2006 are claims arising from a
proposed act or omission involving negligence, default,
breach of duty or breach of trust by a director of the
company. The cause of action may be against a director or
another person (Companies Act 2006, ss 260(3) and
265(3) and (4) (applicable to Scotland)); such a person will
have been involved with the director’s alleged breach of
duties, but he or she may be sued separately (or together
with the director).
According to sections 260(5) and 265(7) of the Act,
directors for the purpose of Part 11 include former and
shadow directors. Shadow directors are defined in section
251(1) of the Companies Act as persons with whose
directions or instructions the directors of the company are
accustomed to act. Former directors remain subject to two
of the seven general duties imposed on directors by
sections 171-177 of the Act (Companies Act 2006, s 170
(2)). These are to avoid conflicts of interest as regards the
exploitation of any property, information or opportunity of
which they become aware at a time when they were
directors; and the duty not to accept benefits from third
parties as regards things done or omitted by them before
they ceased to be directors. The position of shadow
directors is somewhat uncertain (see Gower and Davies,
pp 485-87). According to section 260(4) of the Act it is
immaterial whether the cause of action arose before or
after the person seeking to bring or continue the derivative
claim became a member of the company. Section 265(5),
which applies to Scotland, is in similar terms. However
former members of the company are not permitted to
bring derivative claims. Nevertheless sections 260 (5)(c),
and 265(7)(e) which are in identical terms provide that
references to a member of a company include a person
who is not a member but to whom shares have been
transferred or transmitted by operation of law.
THE COURT’S DISCRETION WHETHER TO
APPROVE THE CONTINUANCE OF THE
DERIVATIVE CLAIM
As already indicated the court has to approve the
continuation of the claim (see Companies Act 2006, ss 261
and 266 (applicable to Scotland)). It must refuse to do so
in certain situations, ie where the actual breach of duty has
been authorised or ratified by the company, or where the
proposed breach of duty has been ratified by it (Companies
Act 2006, ss 263 (2) (b) and (c) and 268 (1)(b) and
(c)(applicable to Scotland)). The court must also refuse to
permit the continuance of the claim where a person acting
in accordance with his duty to promote the interests of the
company would not seek to continue it (Companies Act
2006, s 263(2)(a) and 268(1)(a) (applicable to Scotland);
and see also the judgment of David Donaldson QC (sitting
as a Deputy High Court Judge) in Langley Ward Ltd v Trevor
& Anor [2011] EWHC 1893 (Ch)). The court has to be
satisfied of the latter situation, and does not appear bound
by the views of the shareholder who initiates proceedings.
If the above negative requirements are satisfied the court
has to take further considerations into account before
deciding whether to permit the derivative claim to
continue (Companies Act 2006 ss 263(3) and 268(2)
(applicable to Scotland)). These considerations do not
appear to be exhaustive. The court must consider the
importance that a person acting in accordance with section
172 (duty to promote success of the company) would
attach to continuing the action. This test is similar to the
preliminary negative test already mentioned. The court is
further required to take into account whether the
shareholder seeking to continue the action is acting in good
faith. In its earlier jurisprudence on derivative actions, it
has usually not permitted such an action to continue where
the claim has been brought for an ulterior purpose – Barrett
v Duckett [1995] 1 BCLC 243 and Portfolios of Distinction v
Laird [2004] 2 BCLC 741 – or where there is another
satisfactory remedy, for example placing the company in
liquidation. In the case of Franbar Holdings v Patel (2009) 1
BCLC I, the existence of an alternative remedy under
section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 was an important
factor in the court’s decision to refuse permission to
continue a derivative claim (see Mayson, French and Ryan,
Company Law, 26th ed, OUP 2009 at p 553 for a short
discussion of this case. It has been referred to in a number
of subsequent decisions including the Opinion of Lord
Glennie in the Petition of A M Wishart [2009] CSOH 20
given in the Outer House of the Scottish Court of Session,
as well as in certain English cases).
This principle was also stated in the judgments of
Lewison J in Iesini & Ors v Westrip Holdings Ltd & Ors [2009]
EWHC 2526 (Ch) and Newey J in Kleanthous v Paphitis &
Ors [2011] EWHC 2287 (Ch). The court is also required
to take into account whether the act or omission
constituting the breach of duty could be or would be
likely to be ratified by the company (Companies Act6
Amicus Curiae Issue 90 Summer 2012
22419 Amicus 90 Summer text.qxd:Text  20/9/12  12:39  Page 6
2006, ss 263 (3) (d) and 268 (2) (d) (Scotland)). In the
case of a proposed breach of duty, it has to determine
whether the act or omission could be, and in the
circumstances would be likely to be ratified by the
company (Companies Act 2006, ss 263 (3) (c) and 268
(2) (c) (Scotland)). The court has to take account in
appropriate cases of whether the breach of duty is likely
to be ratified by the company, and not merely whether it
is ratifiable. The concept of ratifiable wrongs has given
rise to controversy in the past (see the discussion in
Gower and Davies, pp 586-8). According to certain
decisions and text-writers, certain breaches of the law are
non-ratifiable. Others have held the view that any breach
can be ratified if the ratification is carried out by means
of the votes of disinterested members. It is noteworthy
that sections 239 (3) and (4) of the Companies Act 2006
require the ratification of any conduct by a company
director which amounts to negligence, default, breach of
duty or breach of trust in relation to the company to be
by the votes of persons other than the relevant director or
any member connected with him. However, section 239
(7) provides that section 239 does not affect any rule of
law as to acts which cannot be ratified by the company.
The court also held in Franbar Holdings v Patel that the
latter provision means that court must inquire whether the
ratification has the effect of improperly preventing a
claimant from bringing a claim on behalf of the company.
This could occur when it had been obtained by the votes of
a member who was associated with the director to be sued,
but who was not connected with him for the purposes of
section 239 (4). “Connected persons” are defined (in a
complex manner) for the present purpose in section 252
of the Act. The approach in this case appears to favour the
theory as to ratification according to which it must take
place as the result of the votes of disinterested members,
rather than the one according to which certain acts are
unratifiable.
The court is also required to take account of whether the
company has decided not to pursue the claim through the
medium of a board resolution or a resolution of the
shareholders (Companies Act 2006, ss 263 (3) (c) and 268
(2) (c) (Scotland)). If such a decision has been made by a
resolution which was not significantly influenced by
persons acting in breach of their duties, the derivative
claim would appear unlikely to be allowed to continue.
Furthermore, the court is also required to consider
whether the act or omission in respect of which the claim
is made gives rise to a personal action as opposed to a
derivative one on behalf of the company. Such personal
actions are not frequently available to members and the
position with regard to costs is more favourable in
derivative claims.
It follows from Wallensteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373
that when permission is given to bring a derivative claim,
the company is normally responsible for the costs of that
claim, even if the claim is unsuccessful. (Now see Civil
Procedure Rules, r 19.9, which provides that the court may
order the company to indemnify the claimant against any
liability for costs incurred in the application for
permission, or in the derivative claim or both). The court
will normally consider the obligation of the company to
pay on a continuing basis when the litigation proceeds and
may be reluctant to give the claimant an unconditional
right to payment. In A M Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd and
others [2009] CSIH 65, the Court of Session found that the
company was liable to pay all legal expenses incurred by the
petitioner in respect of the derivative proceedings so far as
these expenses were incurred from the date of the court’s
judgment on the application under section 266 of the
Companies Act 2006 for leave to raise proceedings until
the procedural hearing of the claim. It also found that the
petitioner should be indemnified against all awards of
expenses made against him in connection with the
proceedings until the hearing unless the court ordered
otherwise on an application being made by the company
prior to the hearing in the event of a material change in
circumstances. The Court of Session reserved to the
petitioner the right to apply in the petition for a similar
order in respect of later stages of the derivative
proceedings. An English court may be expected to adopt a
similar approach.
Particular regard must be paid by the court to the
evidence given of the views of other shareholders in the
matter. This factor may be of considerable significance in
deciding whether to permit the continuance of the
derivative claim. However, the shareholders in the
company may be apathetic or be hampered by lack of
adequate information. The position is rather different in
relation in the statutory derivative claim for unauthorised
expenditure, where the shareholders have the right to all
information concerning the subject matter of the litigation
in the company’s possession once proceedings have been
initiated (Companies Act 2006, s 373). No such right is
available in relation to the general statutory claim under
sections 260-269.
SPECIAL TYPES OF DERIVATIVE CLAIM
If those who are empowered to initiate litigation on
behalf of the company fear that a derivative claim may be
brought against it, they may endeavour to prevent this by
initiating a claim on behalf of the company which they have
no intention of seriously pursuing. In such an event,
sections 262 (2) and 267 (2) (Scotland) of the Companies
Act 2006, allow a shareholder in the company to apply to
the court for permission to continue the proceedings as a
derivative claim if the following factors are present (in
Northern Ireland leave is substituted for permission).
These are (a) that the manner in which the company
commenced or continued the proceedings amounts to an
abuse of the process of the court, (b) the company has
failed to prosecute the claim diligently, (c) it is appropriate
for the member to continue the claim as a derivative claim. 7
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As is the case when application is made to continue an
initial derivative claim (see Companies Act 2006, ss 261
(2) and 266 (3) (Scotland)) if it appears to the court that
the application and evidence filed by the applicant in
support of it does not disclose a prima facie case for giving
permission or leave, the court is required by section 262
(3) (s 267 (3) in Scotland) to dismiss the application and
make any consequential order it thinks appropriate.
Sections 264 and 269 of the Companies Act 2006
provide for a shareholder to apply to take over an existing
derivative claim. These provisions are intended to prevent
directors from frustrating litigation by inducing a
sympathetic shareholder to commence a derivative claim,
which he will not pursue effectively (see Gower and Davies,
pp 621-22 for a further explanation of these provisions).
THE GERMAN RULES GOVERNING
ACTIONS AGAINST BOARD MEMBERS
The German legal provisions contained in paragraphs
147 and 148 of the Aktiengesetz do not mention a derivative
claim (actio pro socio or abgeleitet Forderung), but provide for
a number of remedies which may have a similar result,
except that they cannot be used by individual shareholders
except where their shareholding exceeds a specific amount.
Paragraphs 147 and 148, which contain quite complex
provisions, provide for the bringing of actions against
members of the supervisory or executive boards, or the
founders of the company, who have caused damage to it.
Paragraph 149 is largely concerned with the giving of
publicity to actions under paragraph 148. There are no
corresponding provisions in relation to a private company
and it is a matter of controversy whether and under what
conditions an individual shareholder in such a company
may bring an action against any of its managers.
Paragraphs 147(1) and (2) of the Aktiengesetz stipulate
that the general meeting may, acting by a simple majority
vote, appoint special representatives for the purpose of
bringing a claim for damages against board members or
founders of a public company in respect of wrongful acts
done by them. According to paragraph 136 of the
Aktiengesetz, persons allegedly participating in a wrongful
act may not take part in the vote.
A claim for damages under the above provisions must be
brought within six months of the meeting which decided to
take the action. The special representatives have to be
members of one of the company’s two boards or founders
of the company. However, they may be other persons if the
holders of at least one tenth of the share capital or €1
million thereof so request and the court deems such an
appointment appropriate. The court costs are dealt with in
paragraph 147(2) sentence 3, which provides that if the
court grants the motion, the company has to bear the court
costs. The special representatives appointed by the court
may request the company to reimburse reasonable cash
expenses and remuneration for their services. The court
decides upon such expenses and remuneration and an
immediate appeal may be made against the decision, but
any further appeal is precluded.
The above requirements have been regarded as
somewhat unduly restrictive and a new paragraph 148 was
incorporated into the Aktiengesetz in 2005, which provides
for an action for damages by shareholders against members
of the boards or founders complying with less stringent
requirements. However, an individual shareholder is not
permitted to bring such an action irrespective of the
amount of his shareholding. As in the United Kingdom,
there is a preliminary procedure before an action against a
member of one of the boards or a founder may be brought.
Paragraph 148 (1) of the Aktiengesetz allows the holders of
shares amounting to one hundredth part of the capital of
the company or amounting to €100,000 thereof to bring
an action against members of the supervisory or executive
board or the founders in their own name if four conditions
are fulfilled. It was thought necessary to impose the latter
requirements to discourage unmeritorious litigation
becoming encouraged by the somewhat permissive
character of the provisions.
The shareholders must show that they, or in the case of
a universal succession of title, their predecessors in title,
purchased their shares before the alleged breach of duty or
wrongful act came to their attention by being given
publicity. Such publicity may occur in the financial press,
on the radio or television, or on the internet. Furthermore,
the shareholders must show that the company was required
to bring an action against the alleged wrongdoers within a
specified period of time, and that facts exist which give rise
to the suspicion that the company suffered damage through
dishonesty or a serious breach of duty on the part of
members of either board or the founders. Finally the
shareholders must also demonstrate that there are no
predominant reasons concerning the welfare of the
company which militate against an action by them. The
action must be brought in the Landgericht in the district
where the company is situated.
The above preliminary procedure reminds one of the
rules governing the bringing of a derivative action
contained in sections 261 and 266 of the United Kingdom
Companies Act 2006. However the latter procedure
involves the consideration of different factors. If a German
Landgericht permits the bringing of an action for damages
such action must, according to paragraph 148(4)
Aktiengesetz, be brought before the same court within three
months of permission being given for it. The competent
court is the Landgericht in the district in which the company
is situated. By paragraph 148(3) sentence 2 Aktiengesetz, the
company may itself take over the claim for damages at any
time in which case the shareholder’s proceedings for
permission to bring the action, or for damages, cease.
Instead of bringing a new action the company is permitted
by the second sentence of paragraph 148(3) to continue an
existing action by shareholders. Whether the original8
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action ceases or continues, the shareholders who brought
it are joined as parties to the company’s action.
The costs of court proceedings under paragraph 148 of the
Aktiengesetz are dealt with by the complex provisions of
paragraph 6 thereof. According to the first sentence of this
paragraph, the costs of the application to commence such
proceedings must be borne by the applicant, if such
application is unsuccessful. However, if the application fails
because of considerations, which should have been
communicated before such application but which were not so
communicated, the company is required by the second
sentence of paragraph 148(6) to pay the costs of such
application. The third sentence thereof provides that the
burden of costs is also determined in any final judgment.
According to paragraph 148(6) sentence 4, if the company
brings proceedings itself, or if it adopts litigation against it by
the shareholders, it bears the costs of such litigation.
Furthermore it may only withdraw such an action in
accordance with the special rules contained in paragraph 93(3)
sentences 3 and 4 of the Aktiengesetz. Sentence 5 of paragraph
148(6) provides that if the action is unsuccessful the company
must reimburse the unsuccessful litigant for his costs, unless he
obtained permission to bring the action by means of
deliberately or negligently incorrect statements. The final
sentence of paragraph 148(6) provides that if there are several
shareholders involved in the action against the company, they
are entitled to the costs of one attorney unless more than one
such person is essential for the proceedings.
Publicity concerning the claim for damages is dealt with
in paragraph 149(1). The first sentence of this paragraph
stipulates that the request to bring the claim and the result
thereof must be published in the company’s journals
without delay after such request has been granted. If the
company is listed, its journals must include the
Bundesanzeiger (Federal Legal Gazette) and may include
another journal or the internet. The details which have to
be published are set out in paragraph 149(2) Aktiengesetz.
Paragraph 149(3) requires that any agreement designed to
avoid litigation is subject to the foregoing provisions.
The new German rules contained in paragraphs 148 and
149 of the Aktiengesetz, like those contained in paragraph
147 thereof appear rather detailed and complex, and it
remains to be seen how much use will be made of them. It
should be remembered that German shareholders in a
public company are given extensive rights to information
by paragraph 131 Aktiengesetz, but that such rights may only
be exercised in the general meeting. The use of the right to
be informed may facilitate the disclosure of breaches of
duty by the executive directors, and members of the
supervisory board, and hence the bringing of actions
against them.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the United Kingdom and in Germany, legal rules are
in force which attempt to limit the number of derivative
claims and actions by shareholders against members of the
boards of companies. These rules provide for a preliminary
procedure in relation to such actions. The English and
Scottish preliminary procedures operate in two stages, in
the first of which the court only considers the application
and the evidence provided by the applicant (see Companies
Act 2006, ss 261 (which applies to England & Wales) and
266 (which applies to Scotland)). Unless the application is
dismissed there is then a hearing in which the company is
entitled to take part, and the court hears the evidence
produced by it. In deciding whether to grant leave, the
court has to consider the factors set out in sections 263(2)-
(4) and 268(2) and (3) of the Companies Act 2006. The
latter provisions apply to Scotland.
One of the important factors is how a hypothetical
person acting in good faith (including a director) would
approach the question of continuing with the claim. His
Honour Judge Pelling QC found in the recent case of
Stimpson v Southern Private Landlords’ Association [2009]
EWHC 2072 (Ch), (2009) HL1321871 that, for several
reasons, a hypothetical director would not seek to continue
with the claim and added that even if he was wrong about
this matter there were others reasons against it. A detailed
analysis of the new procedure and the manner in which it
should be employed appears in pages 6-11 of the recent
judgment of the Court of Session in A M Wishart v Castlecroft
Securities and Others).
The need for a preliminary procedure in relation to
derivative claims was already recognised by the Court of
Appeal in Prudential Assurance Co v Newman Industries [1984]
Ch 204 in which the danger of the protraction of the
procedure was recognised. (See also Smith v Croft (No 2)
[1988] Ch 114, in which the court tried as a preliminary
issue whether the company was entitled to the relief sought
and whether the action fell within the proper boundaries of
the rule in Foss v Harbottle). It is evident that the new legal
rules represent an abandonment of the limitations imposed
on derivative claims by the rule in Foss v Harbottle. It remains
to be seen how they will be applied by the courts. In the
meantime, boards of directors may wish to review their
director’s and officer’s liability insurance policies to ensure
that the defence of derivative claims is an insured risk.
The German rules contained in paragraph 148(1) of the
Aktiengesetz which govern the exercise of the court’s
discretion to permit an action by shareholders together
holding at least one hundredth of the share capital or
€100,000 thereof are not so detailed as those contained in
sections 263 and 268 of the Companies Act 2006, which
seem to have been influenced by the fear of a large number
of unmeritorious actions, brought sometimes by pressure
groups. The German provisions contained in paragraph
148(1) sentence 2 of the Aktiengesetz stipulate that if the
Landgericht admits a claim, the substantive action must be
brought within three months. However, if the dispute is of
an acrimonious nature, appeals may result in its further
protraction. 9
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Paragraph 148(6) of the Aktiengesetz contains detailed
provisions governing the costs of an action against
members of one of the two boards or founders of a public
company. (As indicated above, the question of costs was
considered by the Court of Session in A M Wishart v
Castlecroft Securities Limited).
It is interesting to note that there appear to be no rules
of European Community Law governing shareholders
remedies; the enactment of such rules would seem likely to
give rise to controversy because there is considerable
variation in such rules in the different Member States.
Dr Frank Wooldridge
Liam Davies
Solicitor, Marriott Davies Yapp LLP
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